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In  transaction  costs  economics  long-term  contractual  regimes  are  linked  to  exchanges  that  are 
supported by high specific investments, demande  legal commitments and guarantees between the 
parties and therefore require significant negotiating costs. On the other hand, whenever the efficiency 
of the exchange is not based on asset specificity, the absence of negotiating costs makes irrelevant 
the  identity  of  the  parties  and  induces the development of short-term, 'competitive' relationships 
presenting no contraints (or benefits) stemming from the duration of the contract
1. 
 
Such prescriptions are contended by a wide empirical evidence signalling the presence of  long-term 
contracts (or relationships) even when the exchanges does not need specific investments
2 or  the 
negotiating costs are so low that the resort to a complex contractual regime is not justified. As a 
result severe shortcomings in the coherence of the neo-institutional model arise as well as difficulties 
in providing a satisfactory framework to explain continuancy in the exchanges between firms
3. 
 
The starting hypothesis of the present work is that  overcoming  the conflict existing on this issue 
between theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence  requires us  to widen the neo-institutional 
model by introducing a long disregarded category of transaction costs that will be named, for the 
lack of a better word,  'exchange operational costs'. Generally such costs are added to the negotiating 
costs and are made up of the investment necessary to do the following : (i) inform the potential 
exchangers of the possibility and benefit of the transaction; (ii) single out the technical, economic and 
organizational  solutions able to maximize the mutual benefit the parties draw from the exchange; 
                                                   
1  See  Williamson  (1985):  "The  influence  of uncertainty on economic organization is conditional. Specifically, an 
increase  in  parametric  uncertainty  is  matter  of  little  conseguence  for  transaction  that  are  nonspecific.  Since  new 
trading relations are easily arranged, continuity has little value, and behavioral uncertainty is irrelevant. Accordingly, 
market exchange continues and the discrete contracting paradigm holds across standardized transactions of all kinds, 
whatever  the  degree  of  uncertainty.  That  is  no  longer  so  for  transactions  that  are  supported  by  indiosyncratic 
investments. Whenever assets are specific in non trivial degree, increasing the degree of uncertainty makes it more 
imperative that the parties devise a machinery to "work things out" -since contractual gaps will be larger and the 
occasions for sequential adaptations will increase in number and importance as the degree of uncertainty increases" 
(p.59).  
2 See, among others, Lorenz (1989). In addition, recent work carried out by the author  together with G. Ariu and G. 
Seravalli,  concerning  a  sample  of  214  italian  firms  belonging  to  food  and  mechanical  engineering  industries,  
confirms such conclusions. Although the presence of long-term relations binding buyer and suppliers is high, cases 
where  the  buyer  imposes  the  realization  of  specific  investments  on  the  supplier  are  rare  and  often  economically 
unimportant. In addition a comparative study concerning contractual regimes in manufacturing industries in Great 
Britain,  Germany  and  Italy  (Arrighetti,  Bachmann  and  Deakin  1997) has shown that in long-term relationships 
between  buyers  and  suppliers  specialised  investments  for  the  production  of  customised  products  do  not  lead 
automatically to continuous, legally binding contracts. 
3 For an explanatory theory of long-term relationships between firms not based on the presence of relevant negotiating 
costs see Telser (1980).  
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(iii) communicate the content of the transaction to the parties and (iv) carry out the transaction 
logistically, administratively and financially. Savings in this class of costs, as argued further below, 
represent an important reason for resorting to long-term contracts. 
 
This paper is organised in the following parts. In sections 2 a simplified version of the model is 
provided: the relevance of the exchange operational costs in developing transactions between firms is 
discussed  and  the  effects  of  decreasing  of  numeric  variance  of  transactions  on  such  costs  are 
examined. The empirical tests of the interpretative scheme, preceeded by a methodological  section 
(§3), are illustrated in the second part of the work. In the section 4 the costs structure and the 
profitability levels of two samples of firms with a different propensity in producing for the final 
market  and  for  other  firms  are  examined.  The  validation  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  profitability 
differentials are not due to the presence of technological exclusivities is developed in the section 5. 
The impact of exchange operational costs on profitability is explored in the last section (§6). 
 
2. Exchange operational costs 
 
For a single firm, the exchange function encompasses negotiating costs as well as a set of variables 
linked  to  the  informational  and  co-ordination  costs  of  the  transaction.  The  former  have  been 
extensively  analysed,  whereas  the  latter  have  undeservedly  received  less  attention.    Accordingly 
economic debate neglects the fact that firms in context of incomplete information consume time and 
resources not only in choosing what and how produce, but also in assessing  how many potential 
costumers to inform of the benefits of the exchange; and which amongst them to involve in the 
subsequent exchange relationships. In addition, apart from the strictly contractual features, firms 
have to sustain costs in specifying the technological, economic and organizational content of the 
transaction and to employ administrative, managerial and financial inputs to carry out the exchange. 
Finally, once the good to be exchanged is manufactured, the firm has to convey it into the different 




In more analytical terms such expenses can be divided in two features: (i) 'market-widening' and (ii) 
'administrative'  costs.  The  'market-widening'  expenses  precede  unsalvageable  investments  and 
concern    the  costs  the  firm  has  to  sustain  as  alternative  to  negotiating  costs    with  the  aim  of 
protecting the investment from opportunistic conducts of the agents involved in the transaction. The 
characteristics of such costs and the main differences from negotiation costs can be summed up as 
following.  The  firm  carrying  out  an  investment  aimed  at  supporting  the  exchange  with  a  single 
customer (asset specificity) has, in addition to the two solutions in the transaction costs scheme,   a 
third mechanism of preserving the exchange: the search and the involvement in the transaction of (at 
least) one  new firm  that is willing to purchase part of the output produced through the specific 
investment. Let  Ks= specific investment; Is = firm carrying out Ks; PKs = property rights of Ks; Ys = 
output produced through Ks; Ic = firm purchasing Ys; Ysc = product purchased by Ic; PIs e PIc = 
property rights concerning  respectively Ic and Is , Ts = negotiating transactional costs, the above  
 
 
                                                   
4 If the economic agents are imperfectly informed and opportunistic,  the negotiating (contractual) costs>0 unless the 
asset specificity=0   and exchange operational costs >0. If agents are non-opportunistic the negotiating costs=0, but 
exchange operational costs remain >0.   
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mentioned hypothesis are: 
 
H1) PK PI PK PI Y Y s s s c sc s ∈ ∉ = , ,           ⇒ 〉 Ts 0 
H2) PK PI PK PI Y Y s s s c sc s ∉ ∈ = , ,           ⇒ = Ts 0 
H3) PK PI PK PI Y Y s s s c sc s ∈ ∉ = , , α         ⇒ = Ts 0   with α〈1 
  
 In Hypothesis 1, Is carries out the specific investment, holds the property rights of Ks, but sustains 
high transaction costs in defining with Ic  a (complete) long-term contract for buying the whole 
output (Ys,). In Hypothesis 2, Is invests in specific resources provided that Ic buy the property rights 
of Ks. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are standard transactional solutions: the risks of hold-up are reduced 
either by supporting huge costs of defining the contractual regime or by transferring the property 
rights of the specific investment to the other party. 
 
On the other hand, Hypothesis 3 shows the presence of transaction costs=0 as well as the endurance 
of the property rights to the firm carrying out the specific investment. This result stems from the fact 
that Is, making adequate transactional search investments, is able to single out and involve in the 
exchange the firm Icc=Ic that purchases  ( ) s Y α − 1   and acts, according to the hypothesis of 'second 
sourcing' (Riordan e Sappington 1989), as deterrent of the opportunism of Ic. In other words, the 
agent  realizing  the  specific  investment,  instead  of  conveying    the  property  rights  or  defining  a 
complete  contract,  could  prefer    to  assign  a  part  of  the  internal  resources  to  wide  the  market 
(increasing  the  number  of  subjects  involved  in  the  exchange  relationship)  with  the  purpose  of 
decreasing  the  specificity  of  the  investment  and  transforming  the    negotiating  costs  of  a 
monopsonistic or bilateral monopolistic contractual solution into 'market-widening costs'. 
 
The possibility of replacing the negotiating costs with these costs is based  on the assumption that 
frequently asset specificity is not a technological issue
5,6, but depends on the characteristics and size 
of the markets and, on the investments necessary to introduce agents that are different from the 
initial ones
7 into the exchange  
 
The 'market-widening costs' (Cp) can be expressed as:  
 
C p s N e =           [1]  
 
where  Ns = number of buyers (suppliers) involved in the exchange and e = search (fixed) costs of 
each  (new)  buyer  (supplier).  According to the our hypothesis, it is foreseen that exists Ns=Ns* 
sufficiently great to cancel the specificity of the initial investment as well as the constraints  or risks 
stemming from the unevenness of  the transaction that are implicit in contractual regimes involving a 
plurality of  anonymous agents in spot markets. Since Ns* is strictly dependent on the variance of the 
                                                   
5 See also Seravalli 1993. 
6 The asset specificity is not a technological matter in the sense that  an innovation in the technology of firm A that 
generates an innovation in the output of firm B is 'specific' only until firm B is not imitated by firm B+1, ... , Bn. 
Extending  the  concept,  highly  'generic'  equipment  might  be  'specific'  in  a  small  market  and    highly  'specific' 
equipment might be 'generic' in a wide market. In addition the resource K might be 'generic' at time t0 and 'specific' at 
time t1 and vice versa. 
7 The firm will choose among the different alternatives on the basis of a comparison between the relative costs of the 
workable solutions.  
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quantities of output traded in time with each buyer/supplier the more unstable the relationships are 
between  the  parties,  the  higher  should  be  the  number  of  firms  involved  in  the  exchange,  and, 
according  to  equation  [1],  the  greater  should  be  the  resources  assigned  to  'market-widening' 
investments. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  whenever  the  stability  of  the  exchange  between  the  parties  increases,  the 
quantitative variance of the transactions related to each single buyer/supplier  will decrease, and the 
exchange operational costs can be reduced avoiding an increase in the hold-up risks at least until 
when the constraint of having an alternative buyer/supplier is satisfied. Therefore, the high elasticity 
of  'market-widening' costs to the variance of the volume of the exchanges can explain the significant 
interest shown by firms in most industries in adopting measures aimed at reducing the unstability of 
the transactions
8. In addition, and this is a major point in the present analysis, the benefits achieved 
by  reducing  the  'market-widening'  costs  could  justify  the  resort  to  co-ordination  regimes  of  the 
transactions able to increase the stability of the exchanges ( long-term contracts), even when the 
negotiating costs are very low
9. 
 
The 'exchange administrative' expenses are the second feature of the costs we are examining. Firms 
have such expenses before as well after the writing of the contract. They are related to the costs 
                                                   
8  See the set of incentives (or constraints) that the firms introduce in the transactions in order to renew them with the 
same parties. Significant share of advertising expenses and  many investments to bring about switch costs and create 
reputation are spent on this (Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Stiglitz 1989).   
9  It  could  be  maintained    that  long-term  relationships  are  based  on  'implicit  specific'  resources,  that  is  specific 
investments aimed at achieving  mutual knowledge and are carried out routinely by the parties before and after the 
beginning of the exchange. The subjects involved in repeated exchanges  are not at the time able to evaluate them but 
become  conscious  of  the  importance  of  such  costs  when  an  exchanger  decides  to  exit  from  the  relationship:  the 
presence of specific resources hinders the replacement of the party with a more efficient one and tends to extend the 
duration  of  the  exchange  even  when  better  alternatives  are  feasible.  However  the  preceeding  argument  is  an 
unsatisfactory explanation of long-term relationships for the following. The mutual knowledge investment may be 
divided  into  two  parts:  (i)  an  initial,  preceeding-the-exchange  expense;  (ii)  a  post-contractual  cost  related  to  the 
acquaintance of skills, procedures, current economic objectives and scheduled technological improvements of the other 
party.  
The  only  investment  that  preceedes  the  exchange  concerns    'selection'  expenses  for  picking  up  among  different 
(buyers) suppliers the most efficient/profitable one. Generally such an investment is not specific but, even if it is, it 
cannot hamper the substitution of the party. The reason is that specific search investments are inversely correlated to 
the differential of efficiency between the firms: if the differentials are low and the ranking of population of firms is 
difficult, the 'selection' costs are high; on the other hand, if some feature of technogical exclusiveness or monopoly 
exist, the selection process is readily performed and its costs are low. Thus whenever selection investment is high, the 
replacement  of  a  party  is  easy  because  the  alternatives  are  numerous.  Alternatively,  if  search  costs  are  low,  
substitution is more difficult but not on account of 'specific selection' investments.    
As far as post-contractual costs are concerned, the resources labelled 'mutual knowledge' are mostly learning effects 
stemming simply from the repetition of the exchanges and not demanding any (specific) expense by the firms for 
gaining or exploiting them. However, even if 'specific knowledge investments' were carried out, they could not impede 
the substitution of one party.  The investment in  knowledge of the subject involved in the transaction presents two 
main features: a) it cannot be protected contractually since such an investment is not observable; b) it is continuous 
because  it  is  subject  to  obsolescence  and  hence  has  to  be  frequently  and  repeatedly  renewed.  Consequently,  the 
'specific' investment is divided in time and realized with an temporal horizon of short period. So if the efficiency of the 
transaction carried out with the previous agent, apart from the learning effects, is lower than a feasible choice supplied 
from  other  parties,  the  knowledge  investment  is  stopped  and  the  exit  of  the  exchange  is  accomplished  without 
sustaining  significant sunk costs. Therefore the investment in mutual  knowledge cannot hinder significantly the 
replacement of the exchanger and is unable to affect the duration of the transaction.  
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concerning the handling and the co-ordination of the transaction
10 that are independent of measures 
addressed to check the risks of moral hazard. Let  y = average value of the (output sold to) input 
bought from a single (buyer) supplier, Y = (yN) = total (output) input, N = number of (buyers) 
suppliers, the level of the 'exchange administrative' costs (Ca) depends on the number of transactions 



























w β        [4] 
 
For  a  given  level  of  output,  a  rise  in  the number of transactions yields an at least proportional 
increase in the internal co-ordination costs (Radner 1992) and in the costs of resorting to the the 
market (channel diseconomies, delivery expenses, etc.). On the other hand, an increase in the volume 




As for  'market-widening' costs, significant savings in 'administrative' expenses can be achieved by 
modifying appropriate variables. Among those a relevant role is played  by N ( number of subjects 
involved in the exchange)  and by T (number of transactions necessary to sell the output out (to buy 





                                                   
10  Such  costs  encompass  the  formal  specification  of  the  technical  and  economic  content  of  the  exchange,  the 
communication of information about the times and the modalities of carrying out the transaction, the financial and 
organizational management of the exchange and the conveyance of the goods to the final market.  
11Most  of  expected  benefits  concern  costs  of  specifying  the  contracts  and    transport  costs,  but  savings  in 
'administrative'  expenses  may  affect  positively  the  production  costs  too.  Given  the  output,  the  increase  in  the 
concentration  of  the  exchanges  upon  a  circumscribed  number  of  clients  and  the  enhancement  of  the  temporal 
continuity  of  the  transactions  enable  the  supplier  to  schedule  its  own  activity,  maximising  the  percentage  of  the 
optimal  batches  on  the  production  as  a  whole. As a secondary benefit he can pursue a policy of purchasing raw 
materials and intermediate inputs which is more profitable for prices as well as storage costs. Consequently a shift in 
the contractual regime from the short to the long term  can entail significant reductions in production costs. This 
conclusion,  as  we  know,  contrasts  with  the  prescriptions  of  the  new  institutionalist  economics  that  explicitly 
establishes the separability of the transaction costs from the production costs. As Dow (1987) notices: "in comparing 
costs  across  governance  structures,  it  is  essential  that  the  relevant  transaction  be  specified  independently  of  the 
governance  structure  which  is  superimposed  on  it.  Otherwise,  the  claim  that  'transaction  X  is  organised  under 
governace structure Y' would express not an empirical truth, but only a concealed tautology. If  the attributes of a 
transaction  do  not  remain  invariant  when  one  governace  structure  is  replaced  by  another,  the  transaction  costs 
involved are meaningless"(p.18). For a discussion of the independency of production costs from transaction costs and 
of the consequence of such an assumption on the development of the debate of  firm theory, see Dietrich (1994). 
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This highlights the existence of a negative relationship between the average value of output sold to 














     [6] 
 
This again shows a negative correlation between the 'exchange administrative' costs and the number 
of transactions per unit of (output) input. 
 
From the preceeding discussion we can draw the conclusion that whenever transactions demand high 
exchange operational costs, relevant benefits are attainable: 
i.  in decreasing the number of transactions per unit of (output) input; 
ii.  and meanwhile in replacing frequent and widespread but unstable exchanges between firms with 
relationships constrained to few parties, but continuous and durable.  
 
 
3.Methodology of the empirical analysis 
 
Shortcomings  in  the  avaibility  of  statistical  information  hinder  the  verification  of  the  exchange 
operational costs hypothesis.  However,  access to the QRTE.ARC data base has recently been 
opened,    and  as  this  contains  figures  on  the  cost  composition  of  a  large  sample  of  small 
manufacturing firms, some progress in this direction can now be made
12.  
 
It should be pointed out however that because of particualr assumptions on the relationship between 
variables and the extensive use made of proxy variables in testing  the hypotheses,  the discussion 
which  follows is purely exploratory.  The analysis is limited to a comparison between the costs 
structure and the profitability of two subsets of small firms.  These two subsets operate in the same 
sectors,  but they have a different propension to continuous exchange. The first subset contains those 
firms which work mainly,  if not exclusively for other firms
13  and the second subset are those which 
produce goods exclusively for the final market
14.  
                                                   
12  This data base contains figures collected for the input-output table of Lombardy Region in 1982,  which was 
organised by the EEC and the Lombardy Regional Council.   There are more than 606 firms in the survey,  but if 
firms with more than 20 employees are excluded,  and the criteria illustrated in Note 14 are applied,  there are in fact 
only 406.  The variables used in the direct survey were the following:  costs composition,  personnel employment and 
expense,  formation of fixed capital,  purchasing  expenditure on services,  output and sales.  Thanks are due to Dr 
Guido Gay and the IRER for making these figures available. 
13 Firms where over 50% turnover (the average is 83%) goes on work commissioned by third party firms,  who supply 
raw materials and semi-finished goods. 
14 In fact firms were selected in order to exclude cases where the classification into one subset or another could be for 
strictly technical reasons.  Firms operating into industries which our data base showed to work exclusively for the  
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The first subset was expected to contain firms that are more likely to be involved in stable exchange 
relationships  with  other  firms,    or  which  are  more  frequently  oriented  to  develop  relatively 
continuous contractual relationships with purchasers.  In the second subset on the other hand,  very 
much  less  stable  relationships  would  probably  prevail  because  of  their  nearness  to  the  final 
comsumer.  Before presenting the results of our testing, some of the features and methodological 
options for constructing the main variables should be illustrated. 
 
Exchange operational costs 
Two strategies for constructing this variable were originally considered.  The first was narrower and 
concerned a limited set of  expenditures on services purchased by the firm as a direct function of 
carrying out market transactions.  The second strategy was broader and included, as well as the 
preceding costs,  also the cost of staff and the share of internal resources used directly in the running 
and administration of transactions (costs of staff responsible for purchasing and sales,  part of the 
costs of accounting and book-keeping staff,  and a share of  depreciation of  fixed capital). An 
intermediate strategy was adopted in the end,  because it was difficult to measure precisely and 
separate out the individual costs.  The exchange operational costs were thus approximated to the 
IEM/CT  variable.  This is the sum of services carried out by third parties,  (supply agents and 
intermediaries’ fees,  various expenditure and consultancies),  travel and freight costs,  telephone and 
postal charges and running costs  (advertising,    supplying,  bank commissions excluding negative 
interest,  market research,  data processing)  as a share of total net costs
15.   
 
Net profitability 
This is measured in terms of mark-up on net total costs and is shown by the variable PROF1 
 
Net total costs 
This is the sum of fixed costs and running costs net of costs of raw materials and and semi-finished 
goods (variable CT).  The two subsets show a great difference with regard to this costs,  and it is 
worthwhile to point this out because otherwise the set of firms working with other firms would 
appear to have consistently lower costs structures,  as well as higher profitablity,  than the firms 
which operate for the final market.  
 
4. Relationship between companies and costs structure 
 
An  empirical  test  of  the  hypothesis  illustrated  above  will  include  statistical  confirmation  of  the 
following relationships. 
a)Operational costs are expected to be negatively correlated to the incidence of  work for other 
companies on a firm’s total turnover; 
b) It is expected that a significant concentration of internal resources in manufacturing activity will 
be associated with a reduction in exchange operational costs,  and that consequently there will be a 
relative decrease in importance of internal tertiary resources; 
                                                                                                                                                                         
final market or exclusively for other firms were therefore not included.  These criteria,  and the low number of firms 
examined,  meant that those we selected belonged either to the textiles/clothing or to the mechanical sector. 
 
15 The IEM/CT variable also contains a share of negotiating costs.  We presume that in small firms,  these costs can 
be born by the entrepreneurial function and therefore do not largely appear  in the set of costs examined.  
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c) There is expected to be a higher degree of output differentiation in companies oriented to the final 
market than in firms working for other companies; 
d) It is predicted that the costs structure of the two groups will not be significantly different. In fact 
the decision of whether to produce for the final market or to work within exchange relationships 
with  other  companies,    considering  the  selection  criteria  adopted,    should  not  depend  on  the 
technology used,  on the type of product or on the production phase specialisation; 
e)The level of profitablity is less simple to predict.  In fact it is expected that firms working mainly 
for  other  firms  will  not  show  lower  levels  than  final  market  oriented  companies.    There  is 
disagreement here with neo-instiutionalist ecomomics.  It may be however, that where exchange 
relationships between companies are long term,  the savings in operational costs and  economies of 
specialsation  allow  the  company  working  with  other  companies  to  exceed  the  average  level  of 
profitablity. 
 
The method of testing these hypotheses is based on a logistical equation with dependant variable 
SETIMP=1 if the firm is mainly oriented to working for other companies and SETIMP=0 if the firm 
produces for the final market. The independant variables are described in Table 1. The results of the 
calculations  confirm  to  a  great  extent  the  hypothesises  discussed  (see  Table  2).  No  significant 
differences between the subsets regarding costs structure in fact emerge.  The importance of labour 
costs (W/CT),  maintainance costs (MAIN/CT) fixed capital (K/CT) and financial charges interest 
(INC/CT) on total costs show a negative coefficient.  This confirms that the production units in 
exchange relationships with other firms are able to make significant savings in this category of costs. 
Moreover,  there are very clear differences between the two types of firm regarding the degree of 
specialisation of internal resources in carrying out manufacturing activity.  Firms producing for the 
final  market  dedicate  a  significant  share  of  their  resources  to  tertiary  activities,    but  supplier 
companies  show  a  much  lower  level  of  internal  services.    They  consequently  show  higher 
specialisation of resources in manufacturing activity (see MANIF). 
 
TABLE 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN LOGISTIC EQUATION 
 
 
K/CT= FIXED CAPITAL OVER NET TOTAL COSTS 
W/CT=LABOUR COST OVER NET TOTAL COSTS 
MAIN/CT= EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE COSTS OVER NET TOTAL COSTS  
W/L=LABOUR COSTS PER EMPLOYEE 
INT/CT=FINANCIAL CHARGES OVER NET TOTAL COSTS 
IEM/CT=EXCHANGE OPERATIONAL COSTS OVER NET TOTAL COSTS 
MANIF=NON MANUAL WORKERS OVER TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
DIV=DEGREE OF DIVERSIFICATION (INCIDENCE OF MAIN PRODUCT OVER TOTAL TURNOVER; 4-DIGIT  
ATECO 1981) 
PROF2=LEVEL OF PROFITABILITY (PI) (DUMMY: 1=PI≥PI; 0=PI<PI) 
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The limited use made of tertiary input has notable effects on the demand for labour as well as on unit 
cost.  The lower incidence of tertiary work input means that the average cost of labour  (W/L) is 
significantly lower in the first subset than in the second. The hypothesis of  a greater diversifaction of 
output from firms which produce for the final market is not in fact confirmed.  Probably the limited 
size of the production units examined and perhaps the sector classification of output weaken the 




LOGISTIC EQUATION OF SETIMP 
 











W/CT   .4086  .3347 
MAIN/CT  3.5101  1.0734 
W/L      -.0001**  -2.2207 
INT/CT  4.1824  1.3488 
IEM/CT     -5.0451**                   -2.2767 
MANIF        3.8571***  3.2621 
DIV    .4131    .5865 
PROF2       .5836**  1.9431 
COSTANT    -3.9975**                   -2.3436 
 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO     58.016***   




  **=Level of significance 5% 
***=Level of significance 1% 
 
The significance and the positive value of the proxy of firm profitability (PROF 2) also support the 
framework we are proposing.  The fact that companies involved in exchange relationships with other 
production units have a high probability of achieving better than average profit margins supports the 
hypothesis  of  a  positive  correlation  between  development  of  inter-firm  relationships,  efficiency 
improvements and profit sharing. Linking this fact with the preceding results,  it seems that a first  
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provisional  conclusion  can  be  reached  regarding  the  nature  of  exchanges  between  firms  in 
examination.    The  overall  evidence  collected  in  fact  indicates  that  the  increasing  manufacturing 
specialisation of companies, associated with the reduction of operational costs,  does not lead to a 
systematic weakening of the contractual capacity of the supplying company or expropriation by the 
commissioning firm of the profits made in the transaction.  
 
 
5. Profitablity differentials and input composition 
 
As we have seen,  the results of the logistic equation  show that belonging to one or other of the two 
subsets of firm cannot be explained by variables like the nature of input or the incidence of labour 
costs  on  total  costs.    The  evidence  seen  so  far  however  does  not  preclude  that  production 
technology characteristics and in general the composition of input vary considerably among supplier 
firms.  Verifying  this  hypothesis  involves  two  distinct  methodological  operations.  The  first  is 
classifying supplier firms on the basis of input features utilised so that eventual structural differences 
between  the  first  subset  of  companies  are  clear.    The  second  step  is  to  use  the  results  of  this 
classification to examine the relationship between  input quality and profitablity. 
 
The classification of supplier companies was carried out by cluster analysis with non fixed centroids,  
based on variables: 
LNW/L  = labour cost per employee 
LNK/L = fixed capital (approximated to the value of annual costs of  fixed capital net of annual 
leasing charges and machine and equipment maintaince costs) per employee (logarithm) 
LNIEM/L = exchange operational costs per employee (logarithm).  
  
The maximum Euclidean distance was reached for two groups with the following features (see Table 
3): 
- Cluster 1- These are firms which have high levels of technology and high quality of input.  There is 
a  comparitively  high  ratio  of  fixed  capital  per  employee,  they  have  high  operational  costs  of 
coordinating  exchanges  and  their  labour  force  receives  higher than average renumeration or has 
higher than average qualifications; 
- Cluster 2- These are the firms that on the basis of indicators chosen appear to have a low level of 
labour and technology inputs. The ratio of fixed capital per employee and labour cost per employee 
are notably lower than average values of cluster 1. The value of LNIEM/L (exchange operational 
costs per employee) is very modest. Finally the second group shows a high incidence of labour costs 
over net total costs  (W/CT),  and low incidence of capital costs,  and labour demand with average - 
low qualifications (see W/L).   
 
Statistically  significant  differences  in  the  composition  of  input  between  the  two  groups  are 
confirmed.  Labour costs and the annual costs of capital investment as a proportion of total costs 
(W/CT and K/CT respectively) are in fact noticeably different. Technology used by the first group of 
firms is also relatively more complex than that used in cluster 2.  (See the values given for MAIN/CT 
= maintainance costs over total net costs
16.  
                                                   
16  The  difference  in  input  composition  gives  rise  to  a  ratio  of  total  net  costs  over  employees  (CT/L)  which  is  
noticeably higher in the first cluster than in the second,  but these costs are not reflected in the incidence of financial  
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TABLE 3 
COSTS AND PROFITABILITY IN FIRMS GROUPED IN CLUSTER 1 AND 2 
 



















K/CT  0.184  0,063  23.435  .000 
MAIN/CT  0.046  0.021  5.272  .025 
W/L  14.800  11.645  8.424  .005 
CT/L  33.644  15.575  40.297  .000 
INT/CT  0.040  0.035  0.169  .682 
LAVIND/CT  0.074  0.043  1.124  .293 
SUB/Y  0.820  0.876  1.144  .289 
IEM/CT  0.146  0.058  20.592  .000 
PROF1  0.107  0.158  1.204  .277 




W/CT=Labour cost over net total costs 
K/CT= Fixed capital over net total costs 
MAIN/CT= Equipment maintenance costs over net total costs  
W/L=Labour costs per employee 
CT/L=Net total cost per employee 
INT/CT=Financial charges over net total costs 
LAVIND/CT=Value of subcontracting over net total costs 
SUB/Y=Value of subcontracting over turnover 
IEM/CT=Exchange operational costs over net total costs 
PROF1=Mark-up over net total costs 




From the information available, it is predicted that cluster 1 firms will have technological exclusivity 
high enough to determine stable contractual advantages with regard to the subcontractor and higher 
                                                                                                                                                                         
charges  or subcontracting costs over net total costs (INC/CT and LAVIND/CT respectively).  Lastly,  they do not 
modify the propension to offer subcontracting services of the two groups (see SUB/Y).  
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than average profitability.  The information collected seems however to be very different from this 
hypothesis.  Profitability,  as  measured  by  two  indicators  (PROF  1  and  PROF  2)  in  fact  appears 
higher,  although not to a significant level,  in cluster 2 companies rather than in cluster 1 companies. 
Thus the hypothesis that profitability differentials would be explained by the difference in production 
technology  and  the  capacity  of  protection  of  the  quasi  rents  is  not  born  out  by  the  empirical 
evidence. The analysis of the difference between the two clusters does seem to confirm that there is a 
negative relationship between exchange operational costs (in terms of percentage importance on total 
net costs IEM/CT)) and profitablity.  The results of the calculations therefore appear consistent with 
the  proposed  model.    There  are  in  fact  sufficient  reasons  to  believe  that  a)  it  is  possible  for 
production  units  with  no  access  to the final market and which have no exclusive technology to 
develop exchange relationships with other companies; b) they should be able to do this without being 
automatically exposed to the risk of expropriation of the surplus of the exchange or the risk of being 
confined below the normal levels of profitability for the industry. 
 
The relationship between exchange operational costs and profitability will be examined in more detail 
in the next section. 
 
6. Exchange operational costs and company profitability 
 
Within  the  interpretation  framework  we  are  proposing here,  the measurement of the impact of 
exchange  operational  costs  and  other  variables  on  firm  profit  levels  is  particularly  crucial.  The 
analysis is however partial since in the model estimated profit differentials are compared exclusively 
to proxy variables for fixed and semi-fixed costs.  This limitation is partly a result of the shortage of 
information,  but it is also partly intentional. 
 
The objective in fact is to verify whether: 
ì) firms producing for the final market and supplier firms face exogenous sunk costs that are very 
similar and have a similar impact on profitability. 
ìì) the two types of firm differ with regard to decisions on exchange operational costs and with 
regard to the relationship between these  costs and profitablity.  
 
The following analysis examines in more detail the relationship between efficiency and long-term 
inter-firm relationships.  It also brings out an apparent area of conflict between the conclusions of the 
present work and much of the literature on this subject. In fact it is commonly supposed that the 
costs defined as ‘exchange operational costs’,  in that they are investments aimed at widening the 
market,  bring about positive effects on profitability. This supposition is based on the fact that as 
elasticity of demand for non-salvageable endogenous investment is higher than unit  (Sutton 1991),  
firms with high exchange operational costs can dispose of demand that is constantly in equilibrium 
with  production  capacity.    This  has  important  consequences on the efficiency of the production 
system and profit levels.  It is predicted that the results of the preceding discussion will be valid for 
firms  producing  for  the  final  market  (2nd  typology),    but  not  for  companies  working  for  other 
companies  (1st  typology).   In fact,  firms which produce exclusively for the final market, using 
investments  of  operational  coordination  of  exchanges  as  an  instrument  of  extension  and 
consolidation of activity,  are expected to show a positive relation between exchange operational 
costs and profitablity. Companies working mainly for other companies will be different.  For them,  
efficiency is based at least in part on limiting such costs.  According to our hypothesis,  savings made 
in resources invested in the coordination of exchanges constitute one of the main advantages in  
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defining contracts or developing long-term relationships.  It is therefore expected that a reduction in 
exchange operational costs be associated with an increase in profitabilty,  and a negative relationship 
is thus expected. The other hypotheses which need to be verified are the influence that fixed costs 
born by the firm and its size, can have on profitablity.  If the  these relationships were unambiguous,  
the  typologies  proposed  would  be  supported,    as  it  would  confirm  a  high  level  of  evenness  in 
conditions of technical efficiency between the companies examined.  This result would indicate that 
apart from the choices regarding the destination of the product (final market or other companies),  
the companies do not differ significantly with regard to the use of fixed input
17. 
 





PROF1= mark-up over net total costs 
DIM= firm size (number of employees); 
INT/CT=net financial charges over net total costs; 
K=turnover net of purchaising of raw materials and intermediate inputs over fixed capital; 
W/L=labour costs per employee; 
IEM/CT=exchange operational costs over net total costs. 
 
Except for IEM/CT,  the variables require some explanation. K is used as a proxy of production 
capital intensity and indirectly as an indicator of the degree of non-salvageability of the production 
technology.  Variable DIM is introduced in order to record the effect that growth usually detemines 
on the level and variance of profits.  Variable INC/CT is intended to capture the effect that a recent 
cycle of investments,  financed by credit capital,  can have on company profits. The coefficient of the 
independent variables is expected to be negative,  except for IEM/CT which for the above stated 
reasons  is  hypothesed  to  assume  a  different  sign  according  to  which  of  the  two  categories  of 
company it is applied to.  The other exception is K,  which because of the way it is constructed will 
be positive when it indicates an inverse relationship between profitablity and capital intensity.   
 
Table 4 shows the results of the calculations. The calculations of the equation 1 show that while 
proxy  variables  of  fixed  production  costs  and  size  are  important  in  explaining  the  profitablity 
differentials among companies,  the coefficient of exchange operational  costs is mainly insignificant.  
This evidence support the hypothesis that, whether companies produce for the final market or work 
mainly for other companies,  there is little difference between the two types regarding effects of fixed 
or semi-fixed costs on the profitability of production units.  The non-significance of the exchange 






                                                   
17 It should be remembered that this was partially verified through estimates of the  logit model illustrated in Table 2.  
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TABLE 4 
REGRESSION EQUATIONS OF PROF1 (T TESTS IN BRACKETS) 
 
  Eq.1 
 









































YTIP       -                 -  .15983** 
(2.209) 
 











R2a  0.0832  .0913  0.0902 
n. cases  406  340  406 
 
 
    *=Level of significance 10% 
  **=Level of significance 5% 
***=Level of significance 1% 
 
 
Progress in interpreting the role of this variable is made possible by the calculations of equation 2,  
from which the first group of companies was excluded.  The new equation shows a more significant 
coefficient IEM/CT,  as well as an increase in the level of explained variance.  Equation 3 gives 
better results.  It broadens the initial model by introducing dummy YTIP,  identifying which typology 
the companies belong to. (1 = supplying other companies,  0= working for the final market)  and the 
interaction  YTP/IEMCT.    As  expected,    the  estimated  coefficients  indicate  that  interaction  is  
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negative.  It is thus confirmed that the two types of company show different effects of exchange 
operational costs on profitablity. It is positive in production units of the second type,  which shows 
that higher investment in this direction improves the competivity of the company on the final goods 
market.  It  is negative for the first type of company (those working for other companies) which 
confirms  that  the  development  of  relationships  between  firms  can  largely  be  explained  by  the 




In the present work, an explanation model of the long-term relationships between firms attempting to 
overcome some of the shortcomings implicit in neo-institutionalist hypothesis has been presented.  
Applied  to  long-term  exchanges,  the  transaction  costs  scheme  can  provide  an  interpretation 
exclusively of the relationships that are based on specific investments and therefore are justified by 
savings in the negotiating costs between the parties. Except in particular circumstances, such a model 
prescribes  that  long-term  contracts  are  affected  by  high  risks  of  instability  on  account  of  the 
emergence over time of asymmetries between the parties, and the worsening of the profitability of 
the production units less-informed and more distant from the market. Such prescriptions differ with 
much of the evidence available on the relationships between firms. In fact it indicates a widespread 
resort to long-term relationships  even when the exchanges are not linked to specific investment, and 
shows that the profitability of the  firms involved in such contractual regimes is not statistically 
different from the average.   
   
The  interpretative  scheme  proposed  in  surmounting  such  deficiencies  refers  to  a  class  of  costs 
neglected  in  the  current  neo-institutionalist  literature:  it  concerns  the  resources  the  firm  has  to 
employ, apart from the need to check the opportunism, to acquire information about the possibility 
and the benefit of the exchange and to carry through operationally the transaction. Such expenses, 
named exchange operational costs, are mostly unsalvageable and are a direct function of the number 
of transactions per unit of product traded, the size of the relevant market and the (temporal) variance 
of the transactions. In this approach, long-term contracts are justified by the fact that the beginning 
of continuous relationships between the parties entails significant savings in the operational costs on 
account of decreasing the number of  clients and  lessening  the variance of the exchanges. This 
result is achieved avoiding the rise of contractual asymmetries since exchange operational expenses 
are  able  to  reduce  the  idiosyncratic  content  of  the  transaction  and  to  preserve a second source 
alternative. 
  
The implications are that the long term contracts/relationships, instead of regulatory devices aimed at 
safeguarding specific investments carried out before the beginning of the exchange, might be viewed 
as a co-ordination framework able to generate significant economies of specilization and efficency 
improvements  after the beginning of the transaction.  
  
A first empirical verification of the proposed explicative scheme has been successfully undertaken. 
On  the  basis  of  information  concerning  the  costs  structure  of  a  wide  sample  of  small-medium 
manufacturing firms, it has been possible to argue that: 
i. the exchange operational costs represents an important feature of the total costs and therefore 
significantly affect the profitability of the firm;  
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ii. the  firms  more  oriented  to  establish exchange relationships with other firms have (i) lower 
operational costs and (ii) profitability equal or higher than the firms mainly oriented to trade 
with the final market; 
iii.  the  reduction  of  exchange  operational  costs  influences  positevely  the  profitability  of  the 
supplier firms.   
   
The previously discussed outcomes allow us to draw the conclusion that the exchange operational 
costs represent a useful analytical tool in understanding some economic issues like the temporal 
duration of the exchange relationships and features of the vertical integration choice that currently 
lack  a  satisfactory  explanation.  Finally  the  relaxation  of  the  constraints  stemming  from  asset 
specificity shed a different light on the role of the transactional non-negotiating variables and  more 
generally the importance of the learning factors in shaping and conditioning the improvement of the 
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